LLB 224 - Labor Standards

Labor Standards is a study of _

Professor: Atty. Jefferson Marquez

cases | laws


conditions of employment | hiring | labor benefits | payment of wages | wage enforcement | wage orders | wage protection | wage rationalization

R&E Transport vs. Latag

Taxi Operator (D) vs. Taxi Driver (P)
GR 155214, February 13, 2004	[T]

Summary: A taxi driver initially worked for the taxi operator, La Mallorca Taxi. It closed down and a new entity, R&E Transport, was started by the previous owners. Then, the taxi driver worked in this new company and retired. He filed a complaint with the NLRC. However, before the NLRC ruling, his widow accepted only a part of the retirement pay and signed a quitclaim.

Rule of Law: Article 287 of the Labor Code provides that "In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee x x x may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service."

Facts: Pedro Latag (P) was a regular employee of La Mallorca Taxi since 1961. When La Mallorca closed down, Latag (P) transferred to R&E Transport (P). As a taxi driver, Latag (P) received an average daily salary of five hundred pesos.

Latag (P) got sick in 1995 and was forced to apply for partial disability with the SSS, which was granted. When he recovered, he reported for work in 1998 but was no longer allowed to continue working due to old age.

Latag (P) thus asked R&E Transport (D) for his retirement pay pursuant to Republic Act 7641, but he was ignored. Thus, Latag filed a case for payment of his retirement pay before the NLRC.

The labor arbiter credited Latag (P) with 37 years of service for La Mallorca and R&E Transport (D). This was reversed by the NLRC and credited Latag (P) with only 14 years of service at R&E Transport (D). However, before the NLRC decision, Latag's (P) widow accepted a part of the retirement pay and signed a quitclaim or waiver.

Later on appeal, the appellate court upheld the finding of the labor arbiter.

Issues: Is a taxi driver entitled to retirement pay despite of the quitclaim?

Ruling: Yes. Latag (P) was credited with 14 years of service with R&E Transport (D) pursuant Article 287 of the Labor Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7641, provides:

Article 287. Retirement. - x x x In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment, an employee x x x may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year.

Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions, the term one half-month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.

As to the Quitclaim and Waiver signed by Latag's (P) widow, the appellate court committed no error when it ruled that the document was invalid and could not bar Latag (P) from demanding the benefits legally due.

A quitclaim is ineffective in barring recovery of the full measure of a worker’s rights, and the acceptance of benefits therefrom does not amount to estoppel.

San Miguel Corporation vs. Layoc, Jr.

Employer (D) vs. Supervisory Security Guard (P)
GR 149640, October 19, 2007	[T]

Summary: A "no time card policy" for supervisory security guards was implemented thereby eliminating the recording of overtime hours. It is being challenged as a diminution of benefits.

Rule of Law: Article 82 of the Labor Code provides that working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial employees.

Facts: Layoc (P) was among the “Supervisory Security Guards” of the Beer Division of the San Miguel Corporation. From the start of their employment, Layoc (P) and other supervisory security guards were required to punch their time cards for purposes of determining the time they would come in and out of the company’s work place.

Then, San Miguel Corporation (D) embarked on a Decentralization Program and implemented a “no time card policy” whereby supervising security guards of the Beer Division were no longer required to use time cards. In lieu of the overtime pay and the premium pay, the personnel of the Beer Division affected were given a 10% across-the-board increase on their basic pay while the supervisors who were assigned in the night shift were given night shift allowance ranging from P2,000.00 to P2,500.00 a month.

The labor arbiter ruled that there is a diminution of benefits. The NLRC affirmed this ruling. The appellate court affirmed the decision with modifications.

Issues: Is the present case an exception to the rule that supervisory employees are not entitled to overtime pay?

Ruling: No. Article 82 of the Labor Code states that the provisions of the Labor Code on working conditions and rest periods shall not apply to managerial employees. It is thus clear that, generally, managerial employees such as respondents are not entitled to overtime pay for services rendered in excess of eight hours a day. Layoc (P) failed to show that the circumstances of the present case constitute an exception to this general rule.

Layoc (P) was not able to prove that SMC (D) were obliged to permit them to render overtime work and give them the corresponding overtime pay. Even if SMC (D) did not have a “no time card policy,” Layoc (P) could not demand overtime pay if they did not render overtime work. The requirement of rendering additional service differentiates overtime pay from benefits such as 13th month pay or yearly merit increase. These benefits do not require any additional service from their beneficiaries. Thus, overtime pay does not fall within the definition of benefits under Article 100 of the Labor Code.

People vs. Mengote

The State (P) vs. Suspicious-looking Individuals (D)
GR 87059, June 22, 1992 (210 SCRA 174)	[T]

Summary: Three persons were searched and thereafter arrested based on a telephone call from an informer that three suspicious-looking persons were standing at a street corner.

Rule of Law: In warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

Facts: The Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plain clothes men was dispatched to the place and they saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, Rogelio Mengote (D), was found with a .38 caliber revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote (D) and his companion were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.

Issues: Is the warrantless search valid? Is the warrantless arrest valid?

Ruling: No. In the landmark case of People vs. Burgos, this Court declared:

Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of the fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).

                              xxx xxx xxx

In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.

This doctrine was affirmed in Alih vs. Castro, thus:

If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor as stressed in the recent case of People vs. Burgos.

People vs. Saycon

The State (P) vs. Suspected Shabu Courier (D)
GR 110995, September 5, 1994 (263 SCRA 325)	[T]

Summary: The Coastguard and NARMCOM were alerted to the arrival of a suspected shabu courier in a ship docking that morning. The suspected courier was invited for questioning and asked to reveal the contents of his bag. Prohibited drugs were found and he was arrested.

Rule of Law: Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles without need of a warrant.

Facts: Alvaro Saycon (D) was charged with violating the Dangerous Drugs Act when he was found with "shabu".

At about 6:00am, a Coastguard personnel received information from a NARCOM agent that a suspected "shabu" courier by the name of Alvaro Saycon (D) was on board the MV Doña Virginia, which was arriving at that moment in Dumaguete City. Upon receipt of the information, the Coastguard chief officer ordered a combined team of NARCOM agents and Philippine Coastguard personnel to intercept the suspect.

The vessel docked at 6:00am that same morning at Dumaguete City. Saycon (D) alighted from the boat carrying a black bag and went through the checkpoint manned by the Philippine Coastguard where he was identified by a police officer of the NARCOM. Saycon (D) was then invited to the Coastguard Headquarters at the Pier area and he willingly went with them. At the headquarters, Saycon (D) was asked to open his bag and he willingly obliged. In it were personal belongings and a maong wallet. Inside that maong wallet, there was a cigarette pack containing the suspected "shabu". When asked whether the cigarette pack containing the suspected "shabu" was his, Saycon (D) merely bowed his head. Then, Saycon (D), his bag and the suspected "shabu" were brought to the NARCOM office for booking. When Alvaro Saycon was arrested, the NARCOM agents did not have a warrant of arrest.

Issues: Is the warrantless search valid? Is the warrantless arrest valid?

Ruling: Yes. The requirement that a judicial warrant must be obtained prior to the carrying out of a search and seizure is not absolute. "There are certain exceptions recognized in our law," the Court noted in People vs. Barros. The exception which appears most pertinent in respect of the case at bar is that relating to the search of moving vehicles. In People vs. Barros, the Court said:

Peace officers may lawfully conduct searches of moving vehicles without need of a warrant, it not being practicable to secure a judicial warrant before searching a vehicle, since such vehicle can be quickly moved out of the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant may be sought. (People vs. Bagista, supra; People vs. Lo Ho Wing, supra) In Valmonte vs. De Villa, 178 SCRA 211 (1989), the Court stated:

"Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case."

When, however, a vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extensive search, such a warrantless search would be constitutionally permissible only if the officers conducting the search have reasonable or probable cause to believe, before the search, that either the motorist is a law-offender or the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or have been instruments or the subject matter or the proceeds of some criminal offense.

The Court considers that a valid warrantless search had been conducted. It follows that the warrantless arrest of Saycon (D) which ensued forthwith, was also valid and lawful.